The difficulty in sketch-specifying the concept of monoidal category is with arranging that the morphisms of sketches become in the doctrine the lent necessarily strict monoidal functors. To achieve this effect, we modify the concept of monoidal category to what we call "anamonoidal category". The resulting concept can be directly treated by the approach of the present paper. Also, the ana-version has some other virtues pointed out below.
(iii) Each unit specification u E Un [C] picks out an object l,, a unit object; and any two u, v E Un [C] pick out an isomorphism i,.,: I,2 I,. (iv) Each tensor specification s picks out a triple [s] = (A, B, C) = (A,, B,, C,) of three specific objects; we write A @,B for C although A, B are also determined by s (that is, it is not the case that we have an operation 0, defined on all pairs (A, B)). It is possible that two difleerent s, t E Ten [C] (vii) With any four appropriate specifications sO, si, s2, s3, giving rise to
A @,, B, B O,, C, A O,, (B Q,, C), (A OS, B) @,, C, we have a corresponding associatiuity isomorphism
CI so,sI. (s,,, sl, s2, s3) .
(viii) (Existence of unit and of tensor) Un [C] is inhabited: it is not empty; for any A, B E Oh(C), there is at least one s E Ten [C] such that A, = A, B, = B.
(ix) i,,, 0 i,,, = i,,, (u, v, w E Un [Cl) . (xi) (Naturality of 2 and p) (xii) (Naturality of a) of Pure and Applied Algebra 115 (1997) In particular, we have s [A, B] holds. I leave the definition of the rest of the structure of C,,, and the verification of the axioms to the reader. Conversely, given any anamonoidal category C, we pick (axiom of choice), to any pair (A, B) of objects, a particular tensor specification s = sA, B with A, = A, B, = B, and define A @ B = A 0, B. The rest of the data for a monoidal category CcS, are now supplied easily. Note also that this does not use the unique transfer properties. Finally, one notes that, for Can anamonoidal category, CcsJ(a) is isomorphic to C; for this we do have to use the unique transfer properties.
(B) The main argument in favor of the new concept is that it naturally gives the right notion of morphism of monoidal categories; this is the direct notion of a structure-preserving map. A morphism F: C -+D of anamonoidal categories, an "anamonoidal functor", is the same as a functor between the underlying categories, together with maps 
(of course, the first horn-set is that of the monoidal functors, the second is that of the morphisms of anamonoidal categories): given F E hom(C, D), the corresponding F(,) E hom (C(,,, D,,,) has its functor-part the same as F, and for s = (A, B, i: A @ B"-C) E Ten [C&J, F,,,(s) = (FA, FB,j: FA 0 FBa FC) has j = F(i)0 iA,s, the transition isomorphism iA,B : FA @ FB--f% F(A @I B) being given as part of the data for F. It is an instructive calculation to see that this mapping is indeed a bijection. In other words, the new definition of "anamonoidal category" automatically gives the right notion of morphism, which in the traditional framework is somewhat complicated in its appearance (and, e.g., is not given, presumably for that reason, in [23] ).
(C) The concept of a morphism of parallel anamonoidal functors is also more natural than the usual formulation. If Then, keeping in mind the usual notion for the monoidal case, we see that the mapping (1) is in fact an isomorphism of categories.
One feature of the non-strict notion of morphism of monoidal categories (in either the usual or the new sense) is the (unique) transfer propertyforfunctors: "any functor isomorphic to a given one is just as good as the given one". More precisely, given anamonoidal C, D and F E hom(C, D), a functor G : C + D between the underlying categories, and h : F 2 G, a natural isomorphism of functors, we can endow G with the structure of an anamonoidal functor C+ D, actually in a unique way that makes h into an arrow between parallel anamonoidal functors. Furthermore, if C is an anamonoidal category, D is a category, F: C+ D is an equivalence-functor between categories, there is a way of endowing D with the structure of an anamonoidal category and F with the structure of an anamonoidal functor (actually equivalence).
(D) Perhaps the best thing for showing that the present approach to the definition of monoidal category is natural is to consider concrete examples. On p. 159 of [23], we find the description of the monoidal category (Ab, 0, . . . ) of Abelian groups. A few lines above from this description, we find the parenthetical phrase "(any chosen)" in connection with Cartesian product, for the purposes of an example of monoidal category. The fact that a tensor product has to be chosen for each pair of Abelian groups in order to define (Ab, 0, . . . ) is not mentioned, but it is clearly intended. The point of our approach is the avoidance of a choice. We define the anamonoidal of Pure and Applied Algebra 115 (1997) category (Ab, Ten [Ab], . . . ) by putting Ten [Ab] to be the set of all entities s = (A, B,f: A x B + C) such that f is a bilinear function universal among bilinear functions from A x B to Abelian groups; we put A, = A, B, = B and A 0, B = C. The rest of the definition should be clear. The definition satisfies the unique transfer properties, in particular the one for tensor specifications; this is a consequence of the fact that the universal bilinear arrow f: A x B -+ C is determined up to a unique isomorphism. This fact is of course crucial to ensure that the new sense of Ab being an anamonoidal category is related to its being a monoidal category in the usual sense in the tight way described above.
On the basis of the above discussion, I adopt the position that anamonoidal categories are a good (or even better) substitute for monoidal categories, and proceed to exhibit their sketch-specification.
I remind the reader that, in Section 1, we have introduced the construction G 1) 9, which is an "indexed" version of the simpler one, G) 3, and have even pointed out that the category G /I 99 is "better"; it is a (finite, presheaf) topos, while Cl $9 is not (in general). Now, the construction G // $9 becomes essential.
For the notion of (ana)monoidal sketch, we start by taking G = cSk. Let Un be the c-sketch whose underlying graph has a single object, say 3, and no arrows; the specification sets I [Un], CT[Un] are empty. Let Ten be the c-sketch whose underlying graph has the three objects 0, 1 and 2, with no arrows; the specification sets I [Ten], CT [Ten] are empty. We will write 0 @ 1 for 2, because of the use of Ten (to be clarified step by step).
Consider cSk 11 {Un, Ten}. An object S of cSk 11 {Un, Ten) is a c-sketch ISI, together with abstract sets Un [S], Ten [S] , and assignments u ++ U, s t--f S of a map ti:Un + IS(, s:Ten + ISI to each u~Un [Sl, s~Ten[S] . Intuitively, an object of cSk 11 {Un, Ten) is a c-sketch, together with specifications of instances of tensorproducts and units, with the specifications having "individualizing" tags; thus, the very same map S = f may correspond to two different s, t E Ten [S] .
Next, we perform a construction of the type Cl 9, with G = cSk /I (Un, Ten}. We will define objects UnArr, LeftUn, &ghtUn, TenArr and Assoc, of G. We will put MonSk d~r G) {UnArr, LeftUn, iiightun, TenArr, Assoc>, Ten + ITenArrI is the map for which 0 H 3, 1~4,2 H 5; 1 (0, 1,2) I acts as the identity. We will write s, t for (0, 1,2) and (3,4, 5), resp., and ('4x6)
Uni [UnArr] are formed similarly to the previous two. Before describing Assoc, note that Assoc will have an underlying c-sketch lAssoc1, and the latter has an underlying graph 11 hsoc 11. /I Assoc 11 has six objects, 0, 1,2, 0 @ 1, 1 @ 2,0 0 (1 0 2) and (0 0 1) 0 2; it has four arrows: a:0 @ (1 0 2) + (0 @ 1) @ 2, a-i :(0 0 1) 0 2 + 0 0 (1 0 2), 1, and l,_ The preceding two axioms express the existence and uniqueness parts, respectively, in clause (xvi). Finally, we have axioms
expressing (xv). Any anamonoidal category gives rise to a MonSk-sketch, in the obvious way; the resulting sketch allows the unique reconstruction of the anamonoidal category; we may identify the two objects.
Inspection shows that we have:
an object of MonSk is isomorphic to an anamonoidal category iff it satisjies all sketch-axioms of category, and all of the sketch-axioms of anamonoidal category (Axl) to (A x 22) . Moreover, under this identification, the morphisms of anamonoidal categories are bijectively mapped onto maps of sketches.
Variants and extensions of the concepts of monoidal category can be treated in a similar way. Symmetric and braided monoidal categories will have additional specifications and axioms corresponding to the symmetry and the braiding, respectively. For example, the specification of the symmetry is by the sketch Symm = A@,B % -B@,A
A B
Ten [ ] = {s,t} of Pure and Applied Algebra 115 (1997) 241-274 symmetric monoidal categories will be specified in the sketch-category MonSk I{ Symm}. Two of the axioms are Ex [Symm] and Uni [Symm] , expressing the existence and the uniqueness of the symmetry; note that the symmetry depends on tensor specifications.
The treatment of closed monoidal categories is more understandable if it is based explicitly on [27]; I will not go into it here.
Kinds of completeness
For our purposes here, we will have to be specific about size-restrictions. In our previous definitions of categories, we restricted objects to be small; we had in mind (as usual) a certain fixed but arbitrary Grothendieck universe 4?e, and "small" meaning "belonging to %?JO". However, we want certain standard "large" categories such as the category of sets to be members of our doctrines. Therefore, we choose ("Grothendieck's axiom" [3]) another Grothendieck universe a1 with %,, E ulll, and take each of our sketch-categories and doctrines to have their objects restricted to q1 rather than "aO; after all, Q. was arbitrary, the notion of "small" is relative. In other words, we decide that in the previous sections, "small" should be understood as %l-small; in particular, Set, the category of small sets as it appeared in the previous sections, should be understood as Setal, the category of %l-small sets. For the category of %i-small sets, and for that of '?/O-small sets, I will write SET and Set, respectively. Note that concepts such as "locally presentable", "accessible", etc., depend on the choice of the meaning of "small"; the said notions will be understood here with "small" meaning 4!!,-small. Under these conventions, Set will be an object of the standard doctrines.
However, when a category is said to be lfp, we will insist that the class of isomorphism types of fp objects is (bijectively related to) a %?O-small set. Likewise, in the definition of (S, 9) being a finitary doctrine specification, we require that the data going into the description of S (the exponent-category X in the initial presheaf category SETX, the sets of specification names) and the rule-set B are %!O-small.
In this section, the word "small" will be meant as 'V/c,-small". With all other specific notations for categories (Graph, cSk, . . . ) appearing in the previous sections, we stick to the decision that they consist of the %,-small objects of the corresponding kind. Thus, the underlying graph of Set is an object of Graph; the category sketch associated with Set is in cSk, etc.
We could be very explicit about these things (in the style of [3]), and carry the universe-information with all our notations; however, this seemed burdensome to me.
These complications arise because in categorical representation theorems, categories of various sizes appear. For example, the embedding theorems for Abelian categories refer to arbitrary small Abelian categories, and the specific large categories of modules.
In Section 4, we gave the specification (cohSk, %![Coh]) for coherent categories. We know (for references, see below) that Godel's completeness theorem is translationequivalent to the representation-theorem for (small) coherent categories; it is now my task to point out a completeness theorem in terms of the sketch-based syntax which is translation-equivalent to Godel's completeness theorem.
There is an obvious guess we can make. Set, the category of small sets, is a member of the coherent doctrine cohSk : 2 [Coh]; therefore, for any sketch-entailment (T in cohSk,
If the reverse implication Unfortunately, it does not; held, we would have a perfect completeness theorem! not even for finite 0. Take the sketch-entailment
expressing that "every surjective map has a section". This is valid in Set (axiom of choice), but it is not valid in all coherent categories; in particular, it is not deducible from d [Coh] . The way out is to suitably restrict the class of entailments forming the range of O. Recall exactness properties from Section 5. We have that
(1) For any exactness property a in cohSk, we have
In what follows, among others we will obtain a proof (1). In the last section, we will indicate why (1) is translation-equivalent to the Giidel completeness theorem (in the form saying that a sentence is deducible in the standard Hilbert-type formal system for first order logic iff it is valid).
In fact, we develop a framework for completeness theorems like (l), involving representation theorems. We will see, in a general context, that (1) follows from the General Completeness Theorem of Section 2, and the representation theorem for coherent categories: Let S be an lfp category; of course, in practice, S will be a finitary sketch-category. Let X be a set of arrows between fp objects of S. Let us call an arrow in S a X-statement, if it is a pushout of an arrow in X. We introduce a notation to deal with the latter notion; with given s * I u-v w the (a chosen) pushout of the data is denoted as
A X-statement is (up to isomorphism) one of the form $[w] for some w E X and arbitrary $. Note that every X-statement is relatively finite (see Section 3).
Here is a class of examples for X. Suppose that the sketch-category S is based on G (recall from Section 4 what this means). Consider the arrows of S of the form (K) d,f K + K+, where K is a specification-type of S (over G), and K + is obtained by adjoining a single element, the identity, to K in the specification set K [ 1; that is,
= {idK}, and the arrow is the inclusion. We may call the arrows described the specijcation-arrows of S (over G). For example, when S = CcSk, the sketch-category for Cc categories, and G = Graph, then we have five specification-arrows, one for each of the specification types f, eT, f, P and I?xp; the specification-arrow corresponding to J?xp is the inclusion
Let K be a set of specification-types of S, and let X = X[K] be the set of all finite coproducts
En Pi : ,I;I. 'V? + Ij @i i<n Of specification-arrows vi : Qp' + @i. It is easy to see that when K is the set of all specification-types, the finite X [K]-statements are exactly the exactness properties of S (over G), in the sense of Section 5. When X = X[K], we say "K-statement" for X-statement". For a class P of sketches, the P-X-statements are those X-statements whose domain is in P. When X = X[K], we say "P-K-statement" for P-X-statement".
For data as in (3), let us write S bti w to mean that there exists a commutative diagram
In other words, Sl=w iff, for all Ic/: U + S, S+#w.
Let us say that the arrow q: S -P C is X-conservative, if for all (w : U -+ V) E ~$7 and for all + : U --t S, C !=:rpz + w implies that S bti w. The picture for this is as follows:
For any V + C making the square commutative, there is a diagonal making the left triangle commutative. We recognize the notion of purity; see [l] ; in other words, q is X-conservative is to say that v, is pure with respect to the arrows in Xx, similarly to the terminology of [l] . We say "K-conservative" for "X[K]-conservative".
In case X = X [K], this means that p reflects the K-specifications for K E K, that is, for any specification-type K E K and y : K +S, if p,,y~K [Cl, then y~K[s] . If K consists of the single specification-type 'Isol (see Section 5), then v, being Kconservative means that c~ reflects isomorphisms.
A family ( q'i : S -+ Ci)icl of arrows with a fixed domain S is X-conservative if the induced arrow S + nie 1 Ci is X-conservative.
This means that for all (w:U-,I/)~~andforallIl/:U-rS,ifforalli~I,C~~,~,,w,thenS~~w.
Let C and A be classes of objects ofS. We say that C is X-representative with respect to A, if for all S E A, the class of all arrows S -+ C with C E C is X-conservative. Spelled out, this means the following:
forany(w:U+V)EX,SEAand+:U-+A,if for all q:S + C with C E C, we have CbVctiw, then SkG w.
We say "K-representative" for "X [K]-representative". Thus, when S = cohSk, K = {'Isol}, and A consists of the small objects of cohSk:B[Coh], then C = {Set} is X-representative with respect to A; this is the representation theorem (2) above. Note that in this case we could have chosen K as the set of all specification types, with equivalent results.
Let us make two observations. The first is that the condition in line (4) 
(the data for this statement are as in (3)). To see this, assume the left-hand side of (5) (5) is (even more) obvious. As a result of this observation, to say that C is X-representative with respect to A is to say that, for data as in (3) The second observation is that
(7) ifC is X-representativefor A, then C is XX-representativefor A, where .X* is the class of all X-statements.
To see this, we show (6') for w E Xx*. We have a pushout as in the lower half of the following diagram, with w. f X:
But lclCw1 = (VW Cw01, and
where the second implication is by the assumed X-representability, and the third by the universal property of the upper pushout. Now, we introduce another parameter: a class $! of finite entailments (arrows of S); we will be interested in the doctrine S:W. Let P be a class of objects of S. We say that the subclass C of S:?2 gives a complete semantics in S:B for P-X-statements, or that P-X-completeness holds in S:9 with respect to C, if for any P-X-statement, deducibility from 9 is equivalent to validity in C:
for any P-X-statement y.
As an example, (1) says that in cohSk:W[Coh], P-X-completeness holds with respect to {Set}, with P the set of finite sketches, and X = { (Iso)}.
A class of examples is obtained by choosing an infinite regular cardinal K, and putting P = SK, the class of K-presentable objects of S. In the previous example, K = Ko.
We are going to state a result asserting the equivalence of completeness and representability in suitable senses. To have the result in sufficient generality for the applications, we bring in the concept of doctrinal hull; see 3.8. Let q* : S + 'W be doctrinal huh of S, and let y : S -P T. We note the equivalence Indeed, the left-to-right implication holds since 'V E S:.GJ?. Conversely, assume rJ2Fl=Vp,y, AES:.%, and q:S +A. By rV+V,wy, we have 9:T+W such that H 0 '/ = q%. By 3.8. (ii), there is $ : r4F -+ A such that I1/opw = q. Thus, ($oO)oy = 9, showing that AkOy. Proposition 1. Suppose (S, %?) is a jinitary doctrine specification, and Y is a set of arrows between fp objects in S. Let P be a class of objects in S such thatfor any S E P, any of Pure and Applied Algebra I I5 (1997) Assume (lo), to show (11); let y : S + T be a P-X-statement; we want to see that the equivalence (8) holds. The left-to-right implication follows from soundness since C c S: 9'. Assume Ci=y. Let (pE : S + Q&T be a doctrinal hull of S with respect to 2. By 3.1. (iv), Cl= ~~[y]. Applying (7), in particular (6'), in the form we obtain 'JV k+,, 1'. Applying (9) we get k&y. The General Completeness Theorem (3.3.) gives F,,r as desired. 0
Recall from Section 2 the (small) cardinal 3 Ls,s,d associated with any finitary doctrine specification (S, g). When P = S,, K > As,&, then the condition h,(P) c P of Proposition 1, is satisfied, by 3.8.(i). In fact, in this case h,(P) = S,n(S:@ d~r (S%Y),, since for every S E S:B, S is its own (unique) doctrinal hull. Note that, by Section 2, S:W is K-accessible, and in fact (12) every object in S&Y is a x-filtered colimit of objects in (S:%),.
As a corollary, we arrive at the following simpler version of Proposition 1. The "only if" part of the corollary gives that (2) implies (l), in fact, more generally, (1) for 0 an arbitrary small "exactness property", any small ('Isol}-statement.
Above we said that (1) results from (2) and the General Completeness Theorem (GCT); here, via the proof of the proposition, we have brought in doctrinal hulls again, in addition to the GCT. Here is a proof of the "only if" part of the corollary without reference to doctrinal hulls (excepting the implicit ones in the proof of the GCT).
First, we observe that, under the conditions of the corollary, k.dY * (S:@,ky
for all &-X-statements y. The left-to-right implication is obvious. By the GCT, S: 9?!= y =z-t--yly. But by (12) any arrow from the domain of y, a K-presentable object in S, into an object in S:W factors through an object in (S: a),; hence, (S:9I?),by * S: WI= y. The right-to-left implication in (13) follows.
Assume that C is X-representative with respect to S,, y is an &-X-statement, WE(S:L%?),, and O:dom(y)-+ W. We have C%y * cbe [y] j. w+oy r t 3.1
This shows that ck=y * (S:W),by.
By (13) it follows that cl= y 3 I-& which was to be shown. The most frequent case of Corollary 2, in practice is obtained by taking K = cc, the least non-%!,-small (strongly inaccessible) cardinal; the resulting assertion also follows from the conjunction of the cases of Corollary 2 for all K < co. of Pure and Applied Algebra 115 (1997) For (15), note that a morphism of finitary Grothendieck topologies is {Cov,: n E N}-conservative iff every finite sieve (a family of maps with a common codomain) in the domain-category which is mapped into a cover by the morphism is a cover itself; briefly, "coverings are reflected". In (15), Set means the finitary Grothendieck site on the category Set consisting of the finite surjective sieves. Thus, (15) says that in a small finitary Grothendieck site %', a finite sieve is a cover iff it becomes a cover under all site-maps from W to Set.
(15) is essentially identical to Deligne's theorem asserting that coherent toposes have enough points. Deligne's theorem appears as an Appendix to Expose 6 of [3], and dates from 1963. It and its proof have nothing overtly to do with logic. In [24] , a direct proof of (15) is given, without the detour through toposes. The proof in [24] is "purely representation theoretic", without overt reference to logic; in fact, it can be regarded as a "higher dimensional" variant of the standard proof of Stone's representation theorem for distributive lattices (in particular, for Boolean algebras).
Categorical logic, initiated by Lawvere, gradually arrived at the insight, mainly due to A. Joyal, that Deligne's theorem is equivalent to Godel's completeness, more precisely, to the uncountable generalization of it given by Mal'cev in the 1930s. In [30] , the proof of Deligne's theorem is given by applying Gijdel completeness through a two-way translation process between logical operations and categorical operations; the precise spelling-out of the translation is in fact the main point of [30] . See also [16] for a reformulation of Deligne's proof, as well as a sketch of the argument of [30] (announced in [29] ).
The representation theorem (2) for the coherent doctrine can be easily derived from (15); this is done in [24] . It also follows rather directly from Deligne's original theorem (via the "classifying topos" of the coherent category). (14) is a special case of (2), similarly to the fact that the Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras is a special case of that for distributive lattices.
By Corollary 3, and as a consequence of (2), (14) and (15) [pretop] (the doctrine of pretoposes). As consequences, we have the specific completeness theorems saying that in any of these doctrines, an (co-)exactness property is deducible from the axioms of the doctrine iff it is valid in Set. The representation theorem with Set as the semantic object for flSk : 9 [fl], the doctrine of categories with finite limits, is essentially trivial; the resulting specific completeness theorem is less so. To state further completeness theorems, some remarks on exactness properties. In a doctrine of structured categories, a morphism is faithful in the usual sense iff it is {CT}-conservative, equivalently, {I, CT}-conservative. For all doctrines of structured categories which contain in their specification the type of pullback as well as the axioms for pullback, and in which all operations are defined by universal properties (as in Section 4), {rIsol}-conservativeness implies (hence, is equivalent to) full conservativeness, that is, K-conservativeness for K the class of all specification-types. It requires more structure to have {CT}-conservativeness (faithfulness) to be the same as full conservativeness; for pretoposes, this holds, but for coherent categories, it does not.
The conclusion in the sentence before the last is also valid for the doctrine of F-categories (see Section 5); F-categories form a doctrine of structured categories, but F-quantification is not defined by a universal property. The same, mutatis mutandis, can be said for the doctrine of SCcategories (Section 4); this is based on G = Graph' rather than Graph.
In the next two paragraphs, "representative" means "{'Isol}-representative with respect to small objects", the most common concept of representation in categorical logic.
The class of Grothendieck toposes are representative in the doctrine HeySk : L%[Hey] of Heyting categories, with respect to small objects and fully conservative maps. In fact, the subclass of presheaf-toposes SetC (C small category), and also the class of localic toposes Sh(L), with L a frame, is representative. These facts are essentially Kripke's completeness theorem [19] and Rasiowa's and Sikorski's completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic [32, 33] , respectively. The class of presheaf toposes are representative in the doctrine biHeySk : W [biHey] of biHeyting categories; see [31] .
The S4-categories (see Section 5) of the form with C a small category, 1CJ its set of objects, and ( )' the canonical functor, are representative in the doctrine S4Sk : B [IJ] of SCcategories. This is related to Kripke's completeness theorem for S4 modal predicate logic [18] , but mathematically is somewhat stronger; for the exact form quoted here, see [31] .
Several other completeness theorems in [31] are stated in the form of representation theorems for doctrines whose sketch-specifications should be easy to produce on the basis of the examples in this paper.
Keisler's completeness theorem [17] can be translated into saying that the pcategory Set with the IC = K1 interpretation is representative with respect to the class LA? of countable F-categories (and with respect to the fully conservative maps); see also the next section. The corresponding sketch-based completeness theorem results by Corollary 2, with the choice K = Ki.
Next, we describe a representation theorem concerning Cartesian closed categories due to Cubric [S, 61, and the corresponding specific completeness theorem; this uses Proposition 1, rather than Corollaries 2 or 3.
In the case of the doctrine of Cartesian closed categories (Ccc's), we have the notion of the free Ccc over any graph, and, in fact, thefree Ccc over any C&k-sketch S as the Ccc p(S), with the sketch-map is : S -+ F(S), such that Ccc* (F(S), C) + CcSk (S, C) defined by composition with i, is an equivalence of categories. Here Ccc* (F(S), C) is the category of all Ccc-morphisms F(S) + C, with all natural isomorphisms as arrows; and CcSk (S, C) is the category whose objects are the sketch-maps S + C, and whose arrows are the natural isomorphisms between them as between maps from a graph to a category. F(S) is determined up to equivalence of categories.
It turns out that, up to equivalence of categories, the F(S) for a fixed S are the same as the doctrinal hulls of S. In other words,
(19) if i,:s -+ rd4F is any doctrinal hull of S, then i,: S --, 'W has the universal property of is : S + R(S).
This latter fact will be presented in [26] in a more general context. Cubric's representation theorem concerns Ccc categories of the form F(G) for a graph G, that is, a CcSk-sketch with all specification-sets empty; let us call a Ccc of the form F(G) for a graph G a free Ccc. Cubric's theorem says that (20) (Cubric) Any free Ccc has a faithful Ccc jiinctor to Set. Now, let us call a sketch Sfiee if there are a graph G and an cc -deduction I,+ : G + S. Consider the following class P of small CcSk-sketches. Since the composite of two composable co-deductions is again an co-deduction, therefore in case $ : G + S is an co-deduction, any doctrinal hull of S is a doctrinal hull of G as well. Thus, the class S free of free sketches is closed under taking doctrinal hulls. We conclude that 1. is applicable to obtain that The finite S ,,,-{CT}-statements are obtained by taking a finite graph G, extending G by applying the rules of Ccc's to obtain, say, G -+ S, and, finally, arbitrarily equating two parallel arrows f and g in S, resulting in G + S + S[f= g]. The truth of the statement G -+ S [f = g] in a Ccc C is that 'f and g are necessarily equal" in C; that is, whenever G is interpreted in C via a map q: G -+ C, inducing an essentially uniquely determined extension @ : S -+ C, then @('(f) = q'(g). (21) says that if G -+ S [ f = g] is true in Set, then it is deducible from the axioms for Ccc's.
It is well-known that the restriction to the Sr,,, cannot be removed from the Cubric completeness theorem; see [S, 61. Let us turn to compactness. Consider a finitary sketch-category S, and a class X of fp maps in S as before, but not any rule-set 9 as yet. A finite X-statement CI is afinite (X-)approximation of the X-statement q if v, is a pushout of cr; notice that any pushout of a X-statement is a X-statement. Let P and C classes of objects in S. We say that P-X-compactness holds with respect to Cif for any P-X-statement c(, if CI holds in C, then there is a finite approximation of LX which also holds in C (notice that the converse is automatic, and in fact that o! is deducible from any approximation of it).
Proposition 4. P-X-compactness holds with respect to C ifand only ifthere is a set .B of fp arrows in S such that P-X-completeness holds in S:
9 with respect to C.
Proof. The "only if" part is obvious: take W to be the set of finite approximations of the P-.X-statements that are true in C.
For the converse, let 3' be a set of fp arrows. We show that if a X-statement o! is deducible from W, then there is a finite approximation of tl that is also deducible from R; this will clearly suffice.
Assume n is an integer 2 0, and;= (ri : Ri -+ R:), <, 5 n is a sequence of fp arrows. An v-system consists of data of the form S$+S$+S,~S3+
. . . +s,_,~s, (22.1) and. for every 1 I i < n, a pushout diagram
The displayed r-system is finite if each Si is an fp object. An arrow to the displayed v-system from the Gsystem
is given by arrows pi: s^i + Si for i < n such that and such that $i = ci-1~ $i, I/I: = Oi 0 I& for all 1 I i I n. Composition of arrows of r-systems is obvious; thus,%ystems form a category S;. It is pretty clear that filtered colimits in S; exist, and they are computed componentwise. We prove by induction on the length IZ of r that (23) every r-system is a directed colimit ofjinite r-systems.
For n = 0, the assertion holds since the object S is a directed colimit of fp objects. For the induction step, suppose thezsystem (22.1), (22.2) forrof length n, and assume (induction hypothesis) that the 7 dyr (ri : Ri -+ RI), 2 i 2 n _ i-system obtained by deleting the data indexed by II is the colimit of a diagram of the finite T-systems indexed by p ranging over a directed poset P. Then, in particular, S,_ 1 = colim, Si_ 1, with colimit coprojections zi_ 1 : S%_ I + S, 1, say. Since R, is fp, there is p. Let P, = (p E P:p, < p} be ordered as P is, a directed poset, and for PEPO> where ~p_~i" : Sp_ I + Si_ 1 is the connecting map for the diagram of the S,P_ 1. Consider, for each p E P,,, the pushout Rn r, (24) defining Si, cpf and r+Vi; note that Si is fp. By the universal property of the pushout (24), we have 1:: S: -P S, such that 4l r,, *R:,
We also have similarly defined connecting maps 0: ' q : S: + Sz. By (22.2) for i = n, it follows that S, = colimPEPO Sf: with coprojections I:.
We have all the data needed to show that the given Fsystem is indeed a directed colimit of finite Gystems, which completes the proof of (23). Now, suppose that the X-statement CI: S + T is deducible from ,c%. Then, we have n 2 0, a sequence 7 = (ri : Ri + Ri), si<n of arrows Yi E 9, an Zsystem (22.1) (22.2) with SO = S, and a diagram u-v w (25) withwEX;here,~~,=~~o~,_,o..' 0 ql. Applying (23), let a P-indexed diagram of the finite r-systems (one for each p E P, P a directed poset) be such that its colimit is the given one, with coprojections $: Sp + Si. Since U and V are fp, there is p E P such that U: U + S factors as u = rg 0 u' for some u': U + SpO, and the composite rv: I/ + S, factors as (25)). Then (Y' is an fp arrow, which is deducible from the first diagram in (26) (since &, is directly deducible), and which is a finite X-approximation of M by the second diagram in (26). This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 0
In the next section, we will show that in case the traditional concept of compactness is available, namely in the case of first order logic and its extensions with generalized quantifiers, our concept is equivalent to the traditional one.
Proposition 4 says that compactness is equivalent to axiomatizability by a set of finite axioms. The corresponding assertion in the traditional context is a well-known, and trivial, fact. Of course, the completeness theorems mentioned above as examples each have a corollary in the way of a compactness assertion.
In the traditional context, by abstract completeness we mean the recursive enumerability of validities. Abstract completeness is held up as the essential content of completeness, independent of a specific axiomatization. Of course, compactness is also such an "essential content", but less "basic" in some sense (certainly less finitary). As we noted in Section 3, when we are in a finite sketch-category, the set 58[L%] = {s:l-, > ff s o ormal consequences of an r.e. set 2 of rules is r.e. As it happens, in most cases in practice we have a$nite set %? of rules that axiomatizes the concept at hand. Of course, in all these cases, abstract completeness holds, where, formally, we say that, with respect to any given parameters S, xx, P and C as before, abstract completeness holds if the set of finite P&-statements valid in C form an r.e. set. The value of the notions introduced in this section lies in their uniformity and conceptual simplicity. Now it is possible to ask, concerning categorically given logics, questions, the kind of which the logicians used to ask about logics defined by generalized quantifiers. For instance, consider the doctrine of finite limits and finite colimits (thus, this extends the doctrine of pretoposes by having arbitrary coequalizers). Is the set of exactness properties with domain a free sketch (defined now in flcSk (see Section 4) as free sketches were in CcSk) that are true in Set recursively enumerable; finitely axiomatizable? There are a number of interesting questions of completeness concerning notions of monoidal categories. Our framework does not materially help in solving these problems, it only gives a convenient formulation to them.
Sketch-semantics versus Tarskian semantics
In this section, I explain how Tarski-type semantics can be related to sketchsemantics. This may contribute to a better understanding of sketch-semantics. We will see that compactness in the usual sense for a generalized quantifier with a specific semantics is equivalent to compactness in the sense of the previous section for appropriately chosen parameters. In the case when we have axiomatizability (as for instance we do for the case of the "there are uncountably many" quantifier), we will establish the existence of a recursive translation in both directions between deductions in the usual sense and in the sketch-based sense. We will stop short of spelling out an explicit translation of one kind of deduction into the other, although it would not be difficult to do it.
For specificity, let us consider (full, finitary, possibly multi-sorted) first order logic with (sorted) equality, with a new quantifier 9x added. Thus, formulas are formed as in first order logic, together with a new formation-rule, allowing F"lxq as a formula for any formula q. For specificity, we consider t (true; 0-ary operator), A ,l and 3 as primitive, and the other first-order operators as abbreviations in the usual way. The notions of free and bounded variables, alphabetic variants, proper substitution and the like remain essentially the same as in ordinary first order logic; the F-quantifier is handled syntactically just as 3x and Vx are.
A semantics of the B quantifier is specified by giving a class Y of pairs (X, A) of sets, with A being a subset of X, subject to the condition of invariance under isomorphism: of Pure and Applied Algebra IIS ('1997) We have the example, with any fixed cardinal K, of the semantics yK consisting of those (X, A) in which the cardinality of A is less than K. With K = HI, this is the semantics we had in mind in Section 6 in connection with "8-categories". A "dual" semantics 9' would have (X, A) E 9 iff #(X -A) < K; still another dual would have (X, A) E Y iff #A 2 K. Both of these latter quantifiers are expressible using 9 in the first sense.
More "interesting" quantifiers can be introduced, by allowing the quantifier to bind more than one variable at a time, or even allowing quantification of variables ranging over subsets of the universe of the model, etc; see [4b] . The translations and conclusions given below have counterparts in the more involved situations as well.
Given a semantics Y as described, we can evaluate formulas in any structure. From now on, we consider Y fixed.
Let L be a language in the usual sense, that is, a collection of sorts, and sorted relation-symbols; for the sake of simplicity of exposition, we disallow operationsymbols. The notion of L-structure is the usual one. Z,y, . . . always denote a proper variable sequence, that is, a finite sequence of distinct, sorted, variables. xis oftype 2 if 2'= Cxi)* <isn, Z = (X,)1 lisn and xi:Xi (xi is of sort Xi).
An entity [%I ~1 (actually, simply an ordered pair (2, q)), where ~7 is a formula with all free variables in 2, is called an (L-) (or Mod9 (T) ), with morphisms the isomorphisms of LT-structures; we ignore all morphisms but the isomorphisms.
We consider P-sketches, objects in the sketch-category KSk defined in Section 6; of course 9Sk is independent of the semantics Y. However, 9 gives rise to a specific object Set,,, in 9Sk. As far as the specification-types for BoolSk (= cohSk) are concerned, Set,, is given as the Boolean category Set. For the specification-type 4 (see (1.1) For every sort X EL, an object X in S.
(1.2) For every _? = (X,), slsn occurring in T, an object denoted r?, or nl= 1 Xi, together with arrows zi : fly= r Xi -+ Xi (1 I i I n), and the specification to the effect that (ni)i "is a product diagram". When 2 is of type 2, [Z] means 2.
(1.3) For every relation-symbol "R-X1 x ... x X," in L, an object R and an arrow R ?Q fly= i Xi in S, together with the specification that mR "is a monomorphism". 
To see this, we first characterize (iso)morphisms im Mod(S[T]). (Clearly, the condition on (kx)x is necessary for the existence of such h.) Indeed, we define hx = kx, hz = nl= 1 kxi, hR = kR from (4). Next, we define the For this, we use the items (1.7) to (1.1 l), and the fact that the diagrams in those items are mapped by I and J into such diagrams in Set with known properties. Note especially that the recursion-step for the case of [?:9yq] uses the assumption of isomorphism invariance of 9'. Finally, we need to define the components of h at certain auxiliary objects that come up in items (1.7) to (l.ll), e.g., the P in (1.7); these are also uniquely determined under the naturality requirement.
To define the functor (2), we note that if h : M 5 N, we can put kx = hx and have that each diagram (4) commutes for suitable kR since it is the same as
6: fi -+ Z? is given by (3) such that i;x = hx for sorts X. We have that the functor (2) is an equivalence of categories. In fact, we have that every model I : T + Set,,, gives rise to the L,-structure r", for which I"X = IX, and for "R-fly= 1 Xi" I"R is defined by the diagram incl .
in Set where the right-hand vertical arrow is the canonical bijection between a standard Cartesian product and another product in Set. Moreover, I"is a model of T, and I : (r",^ r I by a unique isomorphism 1 whose components lx, X a sort, are identities; the unique existence of 1 is ensured by (3). Let now T be a simple theory T = (LT, C,), and o and LT-sentence. As usual, we write First of all, we have a version for pure first order logic, without the F-quantifier; to obtain this, in the above, ignore all references to B and 9. We have (6) for any first-order theory T, sentence [T in the language of T, and the corresponding BoolSk-sketch entailment ar,O. Now, let us apply both the Giidel-Mal'cev completeness theorem and the sketch-based completeness theorem 8. (18) for first-order logic. First, we apply Godel's to conclude that where "T F 6' means that "0 is deducible in T" in the standard formal system. It is possible to describe such recursive functions quite explicitly, by extending the translation process started above to deductions.
The above translation of symbolic logic into sketch-logic allows us to infer compactness or abstract completeness for symbolic logic from the same-named property (understood in the sense of the last section) for sketch-logic.
A subtheory of the (simple) theory T is any (simple) theory T' such that Lr, c LT and CT' c CT. Let us write T' I T if this holds. For any theory T, the finite subtheories of T, ordered under I , form a directed poset. Let T and the LT-sentence We also have the converses of (12) and (13) (obtained by replacing "is implied by" with "implies"). To prove these statements, we need to develop a translation of sketch-semantics into Tarskian semantics.
To any F-Sk-sketch S, we associate a simple theory T[S] = (L,, C,) such that we have an isomorphism Mod,,,,(S) z Mod~zt,VCSI) (14) of groupoids. The language Ls of T[S] is, by definition, the underlying graph of S; that is, the sorts of Ls are the objects of S, Ls has a unary operation symbol 'tf: A -+ B" for each arrow f: A + B of S, and Ls has no other symbols. The axioms of T [S] correspond to the specifications in S; each specification of S is "expressed" by an axiom. In 8Sk, we have the specification-type f, pb, 'Isol, 'Monk, 2, &join and &. We will give the axioms corresponding to the pb-and the &-specifications. For the rest, the reader may consult [30, pp. 90-921 , where axioms are used for a similar task of "expressing". Recall that pb is 
